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ABSTRACT 
 
Remittance flows have become a vital source of foreign exchange for many developing countries. 
As a result, the issue of whether they act as complements or substitutes for domestic investment 
remains an important avenue of research. We know that remittances can act as compensatory 
transfers, in which case altruistic motives may dominate. We also know that they can act as 
standard capital flows, where self-interest/ investment motivates may dominate. Hence, the motives 
behind remittance flows can have a direct bearing on how they influence domestic capital 
formation. In addition, the short-run relationship between domestic investment and remittances 
may be different from their long-run relationship. In light of these considerations, this paper re-
examines whether migrant remittances “crowd in” or “crowd out” investment in developing 
countries, using a sample of 47 developing and emerging economies. The paper employs recently 
developed panel cointegration techniques given that these can overcome a number of important 
issues. First, we explicitly account for cross-sectional dependence, outliers as well as cross-
sectional heterogeneity. Second, since our variables of interest may be influenced by various 
factors emanating from, for example, domestic policy changes or global economic trends, we 
account for structural breaks and regime shifts. Third, the approaches we employ are robust to 
endogeneity and many forms of omitted variable bias. Fourth, we examine both the long-run as 
well as the short-run relationship between remittance flows and domestic investment, employing 
panel error correction model to uncover the short-run dynamics. Finally, we conduct a panel 
Granger causality analysis to establish whether these relationships are indeed of a causal nature. 
The results of the paper show that remittances form a long-run equilibrium relation with domestic 
investment. The results of the panel vector error correction model reveal the absence of a short-run 
relationship but the presence of a long-run bidirectional link between remittances and investment. 
Thus, remittances drive investment while investment itself causes more remittances, suggesting that 
remittances are not only driven by altruistic motives but also investment motives. This long-run 
(causal) two-way relationship is robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. However, when the 
sample is disaggregated into regions, the results of the Asian sub-sample are statistically 
insignificant. We suspect that this is due to the low number of observations from that region. An 
important policy implication emanating from this study is that developing countries should improve 
the effectiveness of remittance inflows given that these can augment the rate of capital 
accumulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last few decades, migrant remittances have taken a more prominent role in 
developing countries. As a result, the question of whether they crowd-in or crowd-out 
domestic investment has become an important policy issue. In general terms, the 
macroeconomic effects of remittances largely depend on whether they act as pure 
compensatory transfers or capital flows (Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah, 2005). In the 
first case, altruistic motives dominate in the sense that the migrant is concerned with the 
well-being of his/her relatives. In the latter case, though, self-interest dominates, such that 
the migrant retains some sort of ownership over the assets and thus uses remittances to 
finance investment projects. From the point of view of economic development, it is 
important to examine the degree to which this ‘investment motive’ exists in developing 
countries given the pivotal role capital accumulation plays in the process of economic 
development. 
However, irrespective of the motive behind remittances, the response of the 
overall economy to increases in remittances could be either negative or positive. On the 
one hand, remittance flows can have negative effects on the recipient economy through 
their adverse influences on income distributions (Orrenius et al. 2010), household’s labor 
supply and savings rates (Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah, 2005). In addition, similar to 
any other resource inflow, sustained levels of remittances tend to be associated with 
“Dutch disease” effects (Amuedo-Dorantes, Bansak and Pozo, 2005; Rahman, Foshee 
and Mustafa, 2013), output shocks (Imai et al. 2014) as well as increases in conspicuous 
consumption rather than productive investments (Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah, 2005). 
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence showing that, although 
remittances may mainly go to consumption, a substantial portion of it goes to human 
capital formation in the form of better nutrition, schooling and health (Gupta, Pattillo, and 
Wagh, 2009). Moreover, increased consumption and even “unproductive” investments 
(e.g. real estate) can have significant multiplier effects, encouraging more capital 
accumulation and growth through spillover effects (Ratha, 2003; Gupta, Pattillo, and 
Wagh, 2009). 
Evidence also suggests that remittances tend to reduce households’ credit 
constraints and thus boost the depth of the financial sector (Guilamo and Ruiz-Arranz, 
2009; Aggarwal, Demirguc-Kunt and Pera, 2011). Furthermore, it has been shown that 
remittance receiving households, on average, tend to save and invest more than other 
comparable households (Adams, 2006). Other studies found that remittances are 
associated with poverty reduction (Adams and Page, 2005) and higher educational 
attainments (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). Finally, remittance flows have been found to 
act more counter-cyclically than other types of inflows and thus are a more stable source 
of foreign exchange at times of economic difficulties (Combes and Ebeke, 2011; Chami, 
Hakura and Montiel, 2009). 
The objective of this study is to contribute to this literature but we depart from 
the existing literature in a number of ways. First, we use recently developed panel 
cointegration tests that can handle a number of econometric issues, including cross-
sectional heterogeneity, structural breaks and endogeneity concerns. Second, we 
examine the long-run relationship between remittance inflows and domestic investment 
  
 
directly unlike studies such as Alleyne, Kirton and Figueroa (2008) who consider the 
relationship between remittances and per capita incomes. Third, we apply panel error 
correction methods to uncover the short-run dynamics in the relationship. Finally, we 
conduct a panel Granger causality analysis in order to establish whether the long and 
short-run effects are indeed of a causal nature. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the econometric analysis, 
presenting the techniques used as well as the findings while Section 3 concludes. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Basic Model and Data 
 
To examine the relationship between remittance flows and domestic investment, we use 
a balanced panel
1
. Thus, the study is restricted to countries with consistent data so we 
end up with 47 developing and emerging economies over the period 1980-2006. The 
summary statistics as well as a description of the sample is summarized in Table A1 in 
the appendix.  
Given that our overriding objective is to examine whether migrant remittances 
“crowd in” or “crowd out” domestic investment in developing countries, it is imperative 
to employ appropriate methods that would enable us to uncover the long-run as well as 
short-run dynamics in the relationship. In addition, we are interested in empirically 
exploring the presence or absence of either/ or both altruistic and self-
interest/investment motives, as explained previously. To achieve these objectives, we 
employ panel cointegration, panel vector error correction and panel Granger causality 
methods. The basic empirical model takes the following form: 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (1) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖𝑡 are, respectively, country specific fixed and time effects, capturing any 
country-specific unobservable that are relatively stable over time and 𝜀𝑖𝑡  is the error 
term. 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡  is the share of investment in GDP for countries 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁 and time periods 
𝑡 = 1, … 𝑇, and 𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the share of remittances in GDP, both sourced from World 
Development Indicators (2011). 
As is the standard norm in panel cointegration studies (see for example, 
Crowder and de Jong, 2011; Herzer and Grimm, 2012), equation (1) is a parsimonious 
specification that solely focuses on the bivariate long-run link between REM and INV. 
The validity of this specification, however, requires that the variables in (1) are 
nonstationary or, more precisely, integrated of the same order. In that case, they would 
have a stationary error term, implying that they constitute a cointegrating vector 
(Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Once a set of variables form a cointegrating relation, such 
(long-run) relationship should exist even if more variables are added to the model (see 
for example, Herzer and Grimm, 2012). 
 
Panel Stationarity Tests 
 
In estimating equation (1), we first test the time series properties of the variables using 
the panel unit root tests developed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (LLC) and Im, 
  
 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS). The LLC is an extension of the standard (Augmented) 
Dickey-Fuller test and assumes parameter homogeneity while the IPS allows for 
heterogeneity across the panel and serial correlation in the error terms. Both the LLC 
and IPS may lead to erroneous results if there is cross-sectional dependence among the 
panel members emanating from, for example, common effects. Hence, we also report 
the cross-sectionally augmented panel unit root test (CIPS) proposed by Pesaran 
(2007), which takes into account possible cross-sectional dependence. 
Table 1 reports the results of the unit root tests which indicate that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in levels, suggesting that the variables are non-
stationary. However, the series are stationary in first-differences, implying that they are 
integrated of order one, I (1). Hence, we can now proceed with panel cointegration 
tests to explore whether there is a long-run equilibrium relationship between REM and 
INV. 
 
TABLE 1. PANEL UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS 
 
Notes: The tests are: Levin, Lin and Chu (2002, LLC), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003, IPS) and 
Pesaran (2007, CIPS . ** indicates the rejection of the null of non-stationarity at the 5% level or 
better. Two lags used to account for autocorrelation and the tests include intercept and trend in 
levels. 
 
Panel Cointegration Tests 
 
Having established that the variables under study are I (1), we now explore whether 
there is a long-run cointegration between INV and REM. To this end, we implement the 
residual based panel cointegration test developed by Kao (1999) which is an ADF-type 
test. The null hypothesis tested here is that there is no panel cointegration against the 
alternative of cointegration based on the assumption of homogenous cointegrating 
vectors. Since the assumption of homogeneity among the cross-sectional units may be 
too strong, we also report the Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel cointegration test which 
offers considerable flexibility as it allows for heterogeneity in the long-run 
 LLC statistics IPS statistics CIPS statistics 
 Levels Diff Levels Diff Levels Diff 
Full sample       
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.41 -1.22** -2.21 -3.09** -2.22 -2.73** 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 -0.23 -1.05** -1.41 -2.81** -2.16 -2.70** 
Africa      
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.39 -1.25** -2.09 -3.06** -2.06 -2.54** 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 -0.31 -1.15** -1.90 -3.30** -2.23 -2.78** 
Latin America      
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.51 -1.29** -2.31 -3.23** -2.41 -2.84** 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 -0.06 -0.67 -0.72 -2.00** -2.04 -2.20** 
Asia     
𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.39 -1.07* -2.37 -2.91** -2.79** -2.86** 
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 -0.28 -1.13 -1.52 -2.75** -1.57 -2.68** 
  
 
cointegrating vectors. Pedroni (1999, 2004) constructs seven test statistics which 
capture both the within- and between-dimensions of the panel. 
However, an important shortcoming with the above panel cointegration tests is 
that they impose a common factor restriction - that is, they assume that the long-run 
parameters for the level variables are equal to the short-run parameters of the variables in 
their first differences. As shown by Westerlund (2007), when this assumption does not 
hold, the above cointegration methods suffer from a significant loss of power. Therefore, 
in addition to the above methods, we also report more appropriate panel cointegration 
tests proposed by Westerlund (2007). Westerlund (2007) sidesteps the assumption of a 
common factor restriction by utilizing the structural (rather than residual) dynamics. The 
Westerlund test can handle serially correlated residuals, country-specific intercept and 
slope parameters along with trend terms. Westerlund (2007) develops four different 
statistics which can be used to establish the existence of a panel cointegration. Two of 
them are panel tests (denoted by 𝑃𝜏 and 𝑃𝛼), testing the alternative hypothesis that the 
panel is cointegrated as a whole (𝐻1
𝑝: = 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 < 0 for all 𝑖). The other two are group-
mean statistics, (denoted by 𝐺𝜏 and 𝐺𝛼), which test the alternative that at least one 
element in the panel is cointegrated (𝐻1
𝑔: = 𝛼𝑖 < 0 for at least one 𝑖). Thus, the panel tests 
assume that 𝛼𝑖 is homogenous for all 𝑖 while the group-mean tests do not require this. 
To formally examine whether the panel members are indeed independent, we 
apply the CD test proposed by Pesaran (2004). Pesaran (2004) shows that the CD test is 
robust to a single as well as multiple breaks in the slope parameters and/or in the residual 
variances of the individual regressions. 
Given the length of the time period we cover and the heterogeneity of the 
countries under study, it is highly likely that our variables of interest may have been 
influenced by various shocks emanating from, for example, regime and policy changes. 
Thus, to fully understand the relationship between INV and REM, structural breaks and 
regime shifts need to be accounted for. In this study, as an additional robustness, we 
implement the panel cointegration test proposed by Westerlund and Edgerton (2008), 
which accounts for both structural breaks and cross-sectional dependence. Westerlund 
and Edgerton (2008) develop two different tests that allow for unknown structural breaks 
in both intercept and slope of the cointegrating model, heteroskedastic and serially 
correlated errors as well as time trends. The location of the structural breaks may be at 
different dates for the cross-sectional units. 
In the top panel of Table 2 below, we report the results of the Kao (1999) test 
which strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration between INV and REM. The 
null of no cointegration is also rejected when we allow for heterogeneous cointegrating 
vectors using the Pedroni (1999, 2004) tests. The table also reports the results based on 
Westerlund (2007). To account for cross-sectional dependence, bootstrapped robust p-
values are reported (based on 500 replications). The results indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no cointegrating relationship can be rejected irrespective of whether we 
treat 𝛼𝑖as homogenous (tests P and P) or not (tests G and G). Thus, there is a strong 
evidence of a cointegrating relationship between REM and INV.  
To formally establish the existence of a cross-sectional dependence, we apply 
the CD test which strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence 
(see Table 2). Thus, a failure to take this into consideration may result in biased results. 
Finally, we consider the effects of structural breaks and regime shifts on the 
  
 
long-run relationship between REM and INV using the test developed by Westerlund and 
Edgerton (2008). Table 2 reports the results for three cases (no-break, level-break and 
regime-shift). When possible structural breaks are ignored (the no-break case) or 
accounted for (the level-break case), the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be 
rejected. However, when we consider regime shifts we fail to reject the null of no 
cointegration.  
 
TABLE 2. PANEL COINTEGRATION TEST RESULTS – FULL SAMPLE 
 Residual-based tests 
  T-statistics 
Kao (1999) ADF -2.983*** 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) Panel 𝜈-stat  -5.235*** 
 Panel 𝜌-stat -2.808*** 
 Panel 𝑃𝑃-stat -6.736*** 
 Panel𝐴𝐷𝐹-stat -8.647*** 
 Group 𝜌-stat 1.087 
 Group 𝑃𝑃-stat -3.585*** 
 Group 𝐴𝐷𝐹-stat -5.480*** 
 Panel cointegration with cross-sectional dependence 
Westerlund (2007) Gt -2.314** 
 Ga -7.765*** 
 Pt -14.221*** 
 Pa 6.588*** 
 Cross-sectional independence tests 
Pesaran (2004) CD without a linear trend 12.660*** 
 CD with a linear trend 12.010*** 
 Panel cointegration tests with structural breaks and CD 
Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) Model Z(N)𝜏 Z(N)𝜑 
 No break -11.530*** -20.550*** 
 Level break -8.350*** -17.840*** 
 Regime shift 3.70 0.062 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis of the Kao and Pedroni tests is that the variables are not 
cointegrated and the lag lengths are based on Schwartz Information Criterion with a 
maximum number of 3 lags. Under the null, the Pedroni tests are distributed as normal and 
their finite sample distribution are tabulated in Pedroni (2004). For the Westerlund (2007) 
test, the optimal lag/lead length is determined by Akaike Information Criterion with the 
maximum of lags set equal to 3 and the width of Bartlett-kernel is set to 3 (bootstrapped 
robust p-values reported). The Pesaran (2004) CD test takes cross-sectional independence as 
the null and its associated p-values are for a one-sided test based on normal distribution. The 
lag length selection of the Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) test is based on an automatic 
procedure and 3 breaks are used based on grid search at the minimum of the sum of squared 
residuals. The p-values are for a one-sided test based on the normal distribution. ** denotes 
  
 
significance level at the 5% or better. 
 
The results hold when we divide the sample into (regional) sub-samples (see Table 3). So 
to sum up, we find that there is a long-run relationship between INV and REM. This link 
is robust to heterogeneity in the long-run cointegrating vectors as well as to cross-
sectional dependence and structural breaks. Hence, we should have more confidence in 
the relationship between INV and REM. However, the results suggest that this link is not 
robust to regime shifts. With this in mind, we now estimate the nature of this relationship. 
 
TABLE 3. PANEL COINTEGRATION TESTS: SUB-SAMPLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: For an explanation of the tests, see notes under Table 2. 
 
 Kao (1999) test 
 ADF 
Africa 1.97** 
Asia -3.42** 
Latin America -4.05** 
 Pedroni (1999, 2004) test 
 Panel-PP Group-PP 
Africa -2.32** -3.27** 
Asia -1.02 -0.63 
Latin America -4.22** -1.94* 
 Westerlund (2007) cointegration test 
Africa  Gt -2.036** 
Ga -6.884** 
Pt -8.317** 
Pa -5.511** 
Latin America  Gt -2.948** 
Ga -10.029** 
Pt -9.179** 
Pa -8.197** 
Asia  Gt -1.979 
Ga -6.358** 
Pt -8.250** 
Pa -8.131** 
Pesaran (2004) CD tests 
 Without Trend With Trend 
Africa 3.09** 3.05** 
Asia 9.47** 3.41** 
Latin America 3.47** 8.50** 
  
 
Long-run Estimation 
 
Having confirmed the presence of a cointegration, we apply the within-dimension-
based dynamic OLS (WD-DOLS) estimator developed by Kao and Chiang (2001) to 
uncover the effect of REM on INV. To implement the WD-DOLS estimator, we 
consider the following panel model: 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (2) 
 
Because our data is non-stationary, the WD-DOLS estimator addresses issues of serial 
correlation and endogeneity concerns by augmenting equation (2) with leads and lags of 
the first differences of the right hand side (endogenous) variable as follows: 
 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡+𝑗=−𝑞
𝑞 Ψ𝑖𝑗Δ𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡+𝑗 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡   (3) 
 
 
where Ψ𝑖𝑗are the leads and lags. The WD-OLS estimator is super-consistent, under 
cointegration, producing unbiased estimates of the long-run cointegrating relationship. 
Nevertheless, a particular weakness with the WD-DOLS estimator is that it 
assumes that the slope coefficients are homogenous across the cross-sectional units. 
However, this pooling assumption, if not true, can result in a serious bias in both static 
and dynamic panels (Asteriou and Hall, 2007). Thus, as a robustness check, we also 
estimate our model (equation 2) using the between-dimension mean-group DOLS (MG-
DOLS) estimator for heterogeneous cointegrated panels suggested by Pedroni (2001). 
This estimator allows the long-run slope coefficients to vary across countries by 
running separate regressions for each cross-section and then averaging them, ?̂? =
𝑁−1 ∑ ?̂?𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 . Thus, the estimates can be viewed as the mean value of the individual 
cointegrating vectors. As emphasized by Pesaran and Smith (1995), group-mean 
estimators generate more consistent estimates, in the presence of heterogeneous 
cointegrating vectors, than do within-dimension estimators. In addition, the MG-DOLS 
estimator has better small sample properties (Pedroni, 2001). 
As highlighted previously, we need to consider the possible issue of cross-
sectional dependency. For example, investment rates and remittance flows in our 
sample of countries may respond to (unobserved) common external shocks (e.g. global 
business cycles), meaning that they may become correlated across 𝑖. Ignoring this 
interdependence may result in erroneous estimates. A simple way to deal with this type 
of error dependence is to demean the data over the cross-sectional units so that the 
cross-section averages of the variables, say 𝑥?̅? = 𝑁
−1 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  are subtracted from the 
observations, say 𝑥𝑖𝑡 . This procedure can mitigate the effects of error dependence 
(Pedroni, 2001; Levin et al. 2002). Thus, we re-estimate the WD-DOLS regressions 
using demeaned data. This simple strategy, while effective, implies that the unobserved 
external factors are the same across countries. To the extent that countries have 
different macroeconomic and institutional environments, for example, it is highly likely 
that their responses and behavior towards remittances would be different. To this end, 
we also apply the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group estimator (CCEMG) 
developed by Pesaran (2006). Applying this estimator, one can rewrite the error term in 
Equation (2) as having a multifactor structure as follows: 
  
 
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = ?́?𝑖Π𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡   (4) 
 
where Π𝑡 is k x 1 vector of unobserved common factors, which may affect the countries 
with different intensities, 𝜐𝑖𝑡  is country-specific error term, assumed to be weakly 
dependent across the cross-sectional units. The common factors Π𝑡 are allowed to be 
correlated with the regressors in Equation (2): 
 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝜂𝑖 + ?́?𝑡Π𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (5) 
 
where x𝑖𝑡 is each of our regressors, ?́?𝑡 is k x 1 vector of loadings, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡   is the error 
term assumed to be independently distributed of Π𝑡 and  𝜐𝑖𝑡  . 
To take into account the presence of common effects, Pesaran (2006) suggests 
that one can approximate Π𝑡 by cross-section averages of the dependent and 
explanatory variables and then run standard panel regressions augmented with these 
averages. As shown by a number of studies (e.g. Pesaran, 2006; Pesaran and Tosetti, 
2011), this CCEMG performs well in small samples and can handle the presence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals and unit roots in the common factors. 
As a final robustness check, we apply Breitung’s (2005) two-step estimator 
which, unlike the above methods, can handle dynamic effects. Following Breitung 
(2005), it can be shown that a cointegrated model has the following Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) representation (in the case of a VAR[1]): 
 
 Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝛽′𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (6) 
 
where ε𝑖𝑡 is a white noise error with 𝐸(ε𝑖𝑡) = 0 and positive definite covariance matrix 
∑ =𝑖 𝐸(ε𝑖𝑡𝜀𝑗𝑡). The matrix 𝛽′ captures the long-run relationship among the variables 
and is assumed to be the same across 𝑖 while  𝛼𝑖 and ∑𝑡 are short-run parameters which 
vary across 𝑖.   In the first step, the country-specific short-run parameters are generated 
from separate models for each cross-section unit resulting in country-specific 
cointegration vectors. In the second step, the long-run cointegration matrix 𝛽′ is 
estimated using the pooled regression: 
 
 ?̂?𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽′𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ?̂?𝑖𝑡   (7) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖𝑡 and ?̂?𝑖𝑡   are based on the generated short-run parameters 𝛼𝑖 and ∑𝑡. Breitung 
(2005) and Breitung and Pesaran (2008) show that this estimator has a normal 
distribution and corrects for endogeneity in the second step. 
Table 4 contains the results of the estimates of the long-run effects of REM on 
INV. The coefficient of REM is positive and highly significant at the 1% level. The 
magnitude of the coefficient ranges between 0.22 and 0.63, implying that, in the long-run, 
a one percentage point increase in the REM to GDP ratio leads to an increase in INV of 
around 0.22 – 0.63 percentage points. We observe similar results when we disaggregate 
the sample into 3 regional groups. In particular, the coefficient of the remittance variable 
is positive for all regions, albeit insignificant for the Asian countries. We suspect that the 
low number of Asian countries in the sample may be the cause of the insignificance of 
this variable. 
 
  
 
 
TABLE 4. THE IMPACT OF REM ON INV  
Estimator 𝐑𝐄𝐌𝐢𝐭 N Obs 
WD-DOLS (Kao and Chiang, 2001) 0.431 [4.460]*** 47 1269 
WD-DOLS (Demeaned data) 0.222 [1.910]** 47 1269 
MG-DOLS (Pedroni, 2001) 0.628 [9.380]*** 47 1269 
CCEMG estimator (Pesaran, 2006) 0.222 [0.981] 47 1269 
2-step estimator (Breitung, 2005) 0.302 [6.293]*** 47 1269 
 Sub-samples# 
Africa 0.414 [3.24]*** 21 567 
Latin America 0.526 [2.66]** 15 405 
Asia 0.151 [0.57] 11 297 
 
Notes: T-statistics in parenthesis. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. The DOLS regressions are estimated with two leads and two lags. 
The regressions include unreported fixed effects. # Sub-sample estimates are based on 
the WD-DOLS estimator. 
 
 
Short-run Dynamics and Causality Tests 
 
Given that the variables are cointegrated, we set up a panel vector error correction 
model in order to explore whether the relationship between REM and INV is of a causal 
nature. To this end, following Engle and Granger (1987), we use the following two-step 
procedure (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 1999). First, the long-run model specified in 
equation (2) is estimated in order to obtain its residuals. Second, defining the lagged 
residuals from equation (2) as the error correction term, the following error correction 
model is generated: 
 
Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾11𝑖𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1
Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾12𝑖𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1
Δ𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝜆1𝑖𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖1𝑖𝑡 , 
(8) 
 
Δ𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2𝑗 + ∑ 𝛾21𝑖𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1
Δ𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾22𝑖𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1
Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝜆2𝑖𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜖2𝑖𝑡 , 
(9) 
where Δ is the first-difference operator; p is the optimal lag length determined by 
standard information criterion. The null hypothesis of no short-run causality can be 
examined, respectively, based on 𝐻0: 𝛾12𝑖𝑘  = 0 and 𝐻0: 𝛾22𝑖𝑘  = 0 for all 𝑖𝑘.  In other 
words, short-run causality can be tested evaluating the statistical significance of the 
partial F-statistic associated with the corresponding regressor. On the other hand, long-
run causality can be tested by the statistical significance of 𝜆1𝑖 and 𝜆2𝑖 (the error 
correction terms), respectively, using T-statistics. 
The long and short-run Granger causality tests are reported in Table 5. The 
results show there is no causal relationship between REM and INV in the short-run for 
the sample as a whole or for the regional groups. However, in the long-run, we find a 
significant two-way causal relationship for the full sample as well as for the African 
  
 
and Latin American sub-samples. That is, increases in INV are both a result of as well 
as a cause of increases in REM. This suggests that remittances are not only driven by 
altruistic motives but also investment motives. 
 
 
TABLE 5. SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS AND CAUSALITY TESTS 
 Dependent variable   Source of causality     
    Short-run Long-run  
      ECT 
 Equation (8)   - 1.260 [0.262] 0.458*** [0.000]   
 Equation (9)   1.920 [0.166] - 0.019*** [0.009]   
    Africa   
 Equation (8)   - 0.020 [0.893] 0.749*** [0.000]   
 Equation (9)   1.590 [0.207] - -0.008** [0.017]   
    Latin America   
 Equation (8)   - 3.640*  [0.262] 0.400*** [0.000]   
 Equation (9)   0.190 [0.665] - 0.026**   [0.032]   
    Asia   
 Equation (8)   - 0.040 [0.851] -0.210   [0.440]   
 Equation (9)   0.840 [0.360] - 0.005     [0.674]   
 
Notes: Partial F-statistics are reported with respect to short-run changes in the respective 
regressor. The ECM is the coefficient of the error correction term. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Additional Robustness 
 
In the first instance, we explore whether the long-run results for the panel as a whole are 
sensitive to potential outliers. To this end, we re-estimate the main regression, removing 
one country at a time from the estimation. Figure 1 graphically shows the coefficients as 
countries are removed and their t-statistics. As can be seen, the coefficients of remittance 
always carry a positive sign which is mostly significant. Thus, the long-run results are 
robust to the exclusion of outliers. 
As shown previously, our results are robust to endogeneity and omitted variable 
bias given the super-consistent properties of panel cointegration techniques. To formally 
show that this is indeed the case, we rewrite equation (1) in the form of a multivariate 
ARDL (p,1,…q) model. This would enable us to capture how domestic investment 
adjusts to changes to remittance flows and other regressors: 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1
INV𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝜍′𝑖𝑘
𝑞
𝑘=0
x𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (10) 
where i and t index country and time, respectively, k is the lag length, 𝛼𝑖 is a fixed effect 
and x𝑖𝑡 = (𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑖𝑡 , 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡). We control for economic performance (real GDP per 
capita growth), macroeconomic stability (proxied by rate of inflation), openness 
  
 
(trade/GDP), and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI/GDP). According to Adams and 
Klobodu (2016), the impact of remittances on economic performance may be conditional 
on the presence of a democratic government. Following their study, we use Polity2 as a 
measure of democracy (proxy for regime type) and the variable ranges between –10 to 
10, with higher values indicating a more democratic regime (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 
2014). As shown by Shimada (2012), the stock of international migration (as share of the 
population) can matter both for the level of remittances as well as their motivation. 
Hence, we also control for migration outflows
2
. All the variables are drawn from WDI 
(2011).  
 
FIGURE 1.  SENSITIVITY TO OUTLIERS  
    
Note: This figure shows the coefficient of REM (left side) as countries are removed and their T-
statistics (right side). These estimates are based on the DOLS estimator. 
 
 
Following Pesaran and Smith (1995), equation (10) can be re-parameterized as: 
Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖INV𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽′𝑖𝑥𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑘
∗
𝑝−1
𝑘=1
ΔINV𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑘
∗′
𝑞−1
𝑘=0
Δx𝑖𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
(11) 
where, 
𝜙𝑖 = −(1 − ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑘
𝑝
𝑘=1
), 𝛽𝑖 = ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑘
𝑞
𝑘=0
, 
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𝛾𝑖𝑘
∗ = − ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑚
𝑝
𝑚=𝑘+1
, 𝑘 = 1,2, … 𝑝 − 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜁𝑖𝑘
∗ = − ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑚
𝑞
𝑚=𝑘+1
, 𝑘 = 1,2, … 𝑞 − 1, 
 
To estimate the short-run dynamics as well as the long-run effects, equation (11) can be 
expressed as an error-correction model as follows: 
Δ𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜙𝑖(INV𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝜑
′
𝑖
𝑥𝑖𝑡) + ∑ 𝛾𝑖𝑘
∗
𝑝−1
𝑘=1
ΔINV𝑖𝑡−𝑘 + ∑ 𝜁𝑖𝑘
∗′
𝑞−1
𝑘=0
Δx𝑖𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , 
(12) 
where 𝜑𝑖 = (𝛽𝑖/𝜙𝑖) captures the long-run relationship between investment and the 
regressors while 𝛾𝑖𝑘
∗  and 𝜁𝑖𝑘
∗′  capture the short-run dynamics linking investment to both its 
past values and the other variables in the model. The error-correction parameter,𝜙𝑖, 
measures the speed of adjustment of investment to its long-run equilibrium following a 
change in the regressors. Provided that 𝜙𝑖 is significant and negative, one can deduce that 
the variables exhibit a return to long-run equilibrium (i.e. there is a long-run relationship 
between them). 
The above ARDL specification overcomes issues of endogeneity since all the 
regressors enter the model with lags. In addition, it allows the parameters to be different 
for each country. To estimate equation (12), we use three alternative estimators that are 
suitable for nonstationary heterogeneous panels which were advanced by Pesaran and 
Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). The first is the Mean Group (MG) 
estimator which runs separate models for each i and then averages the coefficients, thus 
allowing separate intercepts, slope coefficients and error variances. The second is the 
Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) estimator which treats the slope coefficients and error 
variances to be equal across i, while allowing country-specific intercepts. The DFE also 
imposes the restriction that the speed of adjustment and short-run coefficients to be equal. 
Finally, we have the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator, which allows 
heterogeneous intercepts, error-correction terms and error variances but treats the long-
run parameters to be the same across the countries. As suggested by Pesaran and Smith 
(1995), one can use Hausman test to check the validity of the long-run parameter 
homogeneity. Given that, in our case, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of the 
homogeneity restriction, the PMG estimator produces more efficient and consistent 
estimates relative to the other two estimators. So the PMG is our preferred specification.   
The results are reported in Table 5. The first thing to notice is that the error-
correction term is negative and highly significant. This indicates that, in line with our 
previous findings, we have stationary residuals and hence a non-spurious long-run 
equilibrium relationship among the variables. Also, this justifies the parsimonious 
specification we adopted earlier and is in line with the well-known cointegration 
proposition, which states that, provided there is cointegration between (two) variables, 
such (long-run) relationship should exist even if more variables are added to the 
specification (see for example, Herzer and Grimm, 2012). 
 
 
  
 
TABLE 6. LONG AND SHORT-RUN DETERMINANTS OF INVESTMENT 
 Pooled Mean Group Dynamic Fixed Effects 
Variables [1] [2] [1] [2] 
 Long-Run Estimates 
Remittance 0.277** 
(0.114) 
0.230* 
(0.118) 
0.288** 
(0.129) 
0.289** 
(0.130) 
FDI 0.182 
(0.130) 
0.150 
(0.135) 
0.118 
(0.210) 
0.114 
(0.211) 
Trade openness 0.077*** 
(0.020) 
0.067*** 
(0.020) 
0.058* 
(0.030) 
0.057* 
(0.031) 
Inflation (logs) -0.046 
(0.200) 
-0.105 
(0.208) 
0.260 
(0.463) 
0.267 
(0.466) 
GDP Growth 1.066*** 
(0.087) 
1.130*** 
(0.095) 
0.850*** 
(0.277) 
0.859*** 
(0.279) 
Polity2 -0.229*** 
(0.051) 
-0.213*** 
(0.049) 
-0.110 
(0.086) 
-0.104 
(0.086) 
Migrant stock (logs)   -1.545 
(3.941) 
 -1.242 
(7.837) 
Error Correction Coefficients     
Phi -0.299*** 
(0.026) 
-0.292*** 
(0.026) 
-0.301*** 
(0.075) 
-0.300*** 
(0.075) 
 Short-Run Estimates 
D(Remittance) -3.765 
(3.574) 
-2.570 
(2.320) 
-0.105 
(0.099) 
-0.106 
(0.098) 
D(FDI) 0.200 
(0.160) 
0.418** 
(0.189) 
0.253*** 
(0.074) 
0.254*** 
(0.074) 
D(Trade openness) 0.030 
(0.028) 
0.038 
(0.027) 
0.046 
(0.028) 
0.046 
(0.029) 
D(Inflation, logs) 0.140 
(0.158) 
0.199 
(0.187) 
-0.010 
(0.124) 
-0.013 
(0.124) 
D(GDP Growth) -0.051 
(0.039) 
-0.057 
(0.040) 
-0.073* 
(0.042) 
-0.076* 
(0.042) 
D(Polity2) 0.056 
(0.317) 
-0.134 
(0.454) 
0.057*** 
(1.224) 
0.056 
(0.042) 
D(Migrant stock, logs)   43.824 
(29.888) 
 2.697 
(2.312) 
Intercept 3.379 
(0.427) 
4.690 
(0.543) 
3.740 
(1.224) 
4.677 
(6.288) 
Observations  1041  1041 1041 1041 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. The estimates based on the MG estimator are not 
reported given that the calculated Hausman statistic is, respectively, 1.98 and 1.39 for models 
[1] and [2]. The test statistic is distributed as chi2(6) and chi2(7), respectively. The 
regressions control for country and time effects * **, ** and * denote significance level at the 
1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 
Focusing on our variables of interest, the long-run estimates confirm the 
robustness of our previous results. That is, remittances are positively and significantly 
linked to domestic investment. The other variables are broadly in line with our a priori 
expectations, except the Polity variable which produces mixed results. The migrant stock 
  
 
variable is also insignificant. Consistent with our previous panel Granger causality 
results, remittances do not have any short-run relationship with investment. 
 
 
Discussion of the Findings 
 
Our central findings show that remittances have a robust long-run effect on domestic 
investment in developing countries. This result is consistent with the recent findings by 
Ziesemer (2010), who has shown that remittances enhance fixed capital formation 
directly as well as indirectly through their beneficial influences on public expenditures on 
education and literacy. The idea that remittance flows improve human capital (e.g. 
education, nutrition and health) has been confirmed by a number of studies (see for 
example, Acosta et al. 2007; Calero et al. 2009). Hence, these flows are likely to have 
positive effects in the long-run. Our findings are also in line with the results of Nsiah and 
Fayissa (2013) who found that remittances are positively related to economic 
development in developing countries. Similar to us, these authors found that the positive 
impact is significant in Latin America and Africa, while this is not the case in Asian 
countries. Unlike their study, however, we pay particular attention to the properties of the 
variables under study as well as the underlying assumptions of the econometric 
techniques. Given that we employ more superior estimation methods, our results should 
be more reliable. 
As shown throughout, our results are not sensitive to cross-sectional 
heterogeneity, structural breaks, outliers and endogeneity issues. It should be emphasized 
that long-run positive effects of remittances on investment remain even when we account 
for democratic regime and migration outflows. 
Our causality analysis shows that there is a bidirectional causal relationship 
between REM and INV. In particular, remittances drive investment while investment 
itself causes more remittances, suggesting that remittances are not only driven by 
altruistic motives but also investment motives. This could be because of the multiplier 
effects generated by the expenditures of remittance-receiving households may be 
encouraging more investment. Alternatively, it could be that the households themselves 
may be making small capital investments. In the latter case, this could generate more 
remittance flows if we assume that the migrant is not just altruistic but also self-
interested. In other words, if remittance-receiving households engage in successful 
business ventures, the migrants may send more remittances in order to enhance their own 
wealth provided adverse selection and moral hazard can be overcome and trust can be 
established. Results by Alleyne et al. (2008) confirm that remittances are not only driven 
by altruistic motives but also investment motives. Thus, remittances may drive 
investment while investment itself may cause more remittances. These ideas are 
consistent with the theoretical work by Le (2011), who has shown that remittances can 
act as a useful source of finance for investment projects particularly when the domestic 
financial system is sufficiently developed. 
Throughout, we emphasized two main rationales for remittance flows based on 
the seminal contributions by Chami et al. (2005) – namely, investment and altruism 
motives. However, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) highlight a third motive – namely, 
risk sharing and coinsurance. Using Mexico as a case study, they show that migrants may 
  
 
remit more when they face income and other risks in the host economy. Our results are 
consistent with this risk-coverage and insurance motive as well. Hence, remittances are 
not only driven by altruistic motives but also investment as well as insurance motives
3
. 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The objective of this study was to establish whether there is a long-run stable relationship 
between domestic investment and remittances in developing countries. Using recently 
developed panel cointegration techniques that take into account issues such as cross-
sectional dependence, heterogeneity, omitted variable bias as well as endogeneity and 
structural and regime changes, we show that there is a long-run relationship between 
investment and remittances. In particular, remittance flows are positively related to 
investment and thus economic development. This is largely in line with the findings of, 
among others, Imai et al. (2014), Ramirez and Sharma (2008) and Adams (2006). 
The results of the panel vector error correction model reveal the absence of a 
short-run relationship but the presence of a long-run bidirectional link between 
remittances and investment. Thus, remittances drive investment while investment itself 
causes more remittances, suggesting that remittances are not only driven by altruistic 
motives but also investment motives. This long-run (causal) two-way relationship is 
robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses. 
The overall findings suggest a number of important policy implications. First, 
developing countries should improve the effectiveness of remittance inflows. A particular 
channel is the financial system. Thus, developing countries should develop their financial 
sectors in order to allow remittance-receiving households to have the facilities needed for 
productive investments. Given that remittances tend to boost the level of deposits and 
credit in banking system (Aggarwal et al. 2011), a well-developed financial system would 
likely generate more benefits. In the same vein, they should adopt policies that may 
reduce the transaction costs attached to receiving the funds so that households can get 
their remittances as smoothly as possible. One way to do this is to reduce red tape, but 
perhaps, more importantly, competition should be encouraged among money transfer 
companies. 
Overall, the important role migrant remittances can play in economic 
development is not a trivial matter. As shown in this study, remittances can improve the 
economic performance of developing economies by augmenting the rate of capital 
accumulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1. SUMMARY STATISTICS AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 Mean Standard error Observations 
Investment 21.60 7.96 1269 
Remittances 4.20 9.44 1269 
FDI 1.85 4.13 1269 
Polity2 0.96 6.66 1215 
Trade openness 67.96 35.90 1267 
Inflation (logs) 3.03 0.75 1265 
Migration stock (logs) 0.63 1.19 1269 
Real per capita GDP growth 3.47 4.72 1268 
 
Notes: Countries in the sample: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Jordan, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, 
Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Turkey (N = 47). We refer to this sample as 
‘developing and emerging economies’ based on IMF classification (see for example; Nielsen, L. 
(2011). Classifications of countries based on their level of development: How it is done and how it 
could be done. IMF Working Papers, 1-45 (page 19). 
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1
 The techniques we are employing require a balanced panel so our sample comprises of developing 
countries with consistent data. Arguably, this may give rise to selectivity bias but given that the 
sample we end up with is randomly selected, any potential selectivity bias would likely be minimal.  
 
2
 We owe the suggestions to control for both regime type and migration outflows to the referee. 
 
3
 To examine the underlying motives more methodically, a distinction should be made between a 
theory of altruism and a theory of insurance but this is beyond the scope of this paper. We are 
grateful to the referee for highlighting this issue. 
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